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ABSTRACT
We present a methodology for estimating the welfare gains froma product
with new characteristics, and apply it to Japanese and Americancompact
trucks. Our approach can be used on any products for which a hedonic
regression can be estimated.For 1979—80 we find average welfare gains of
$500—600 per Japanese truck.In later years the benefit to consumers is
reduced by the tariff on imports and the introduction of Americancompact
models.American compacts have consumer gains which are much less than the
average for Japanese models, since for each American compact there is an






Recent literature on monopolistic competition and trade has stressed the
welfare gains available through importing new varieties ofa differentiated
product [see Helpman (1981), Krugman (1980), Lancaster (1980) and Helpman and
Krugman (1985)]. In models which incorporate a description of goods in terms
of characteristics, following Lancaster (1979), the welfare gains areespe-
cially large when the characteristics of the domestic and imported goods are
quite different.In this paper we shall present a methodology for estimating
the welfare gains from a product with new characteristics, and apply it to
Japanese and American compact trucks. The application to Japanese compacts is
of particular interest since prior to 1982 similiar American models did not
exist.
Under free trade, the consumer gains we estimate for Japanesecompact
trucks are also social gains.Since August 1980, however, Japanese trucks
have faced a tariff of 25%, up from 4% previously. With this trade barrierwe
continue to measure consumer gains from the imports, and do not include the
tariff revenue as would be required in a social calculation.For American
compacts, available in 1982 and later, we also measure the consumer gains from
having each model available. These benefits would need to be compared to the
research and development costs of compact models to determine the net social
gain or loss.
In section 2 we outline the theory behind our welfare measure. The model
presented extends the analysis of Feenstra (1986) to discrete choice.In
section 3 we discuss the recent history of the truck industry and present data
on Japanese and American vehicles.Our empirical results are contained in
section 4, while conclusions are given in section 5.
We can briefly mention other approaches to estimating the gains from—2—
trade with differentiated products. Harris (1984) presents a general equili-
brium model of Canadian—U.S. trade, and simulates the effects of reducing
trade barriers.He obtains large estimates of the gains from free inter-
national trade.However, while product differentiation is present in some
versions of the model, the main source of welfare gain is increasing returns
to scale on the supply side. Bresnahan (1981) presents a model with monopo-
listic competition of the Lancaster type and applies it the U.S. automobile
industry.Gains from new products could be estimated from this model, and
also from the discrete choice literature pioneered by McFadden (1976). The
main virtue of our own approach is its remarkable simplicity.This is
achieved by focusing directly on the consumer gains from a new product,
without estimating cross—sectional demand or modelling the supply side in
depth.
2. Model of Consumer Welfare
A. Continuous Choice
We shall suppose that the consumer purchases zero or one unit of a
differentiated product, which we refer to as a truck, and any amount of a
homogeneous good. Utility from consuming truck services is U(q,O) where q =
(q1,...,q) 0 is a vector of physical characteristics (size, weight,
horsepower, etc.), and 0 =°i'••'°n 0 is a vector of taste parameters
which differs across individuals. We shall adopt a specific functional form
for utility,
n
ii(Q\— (A) — .q. ,
where qA) (q —1)/A,0 A< 1
=lnq1, ifAO—3—
(1) is a CES utility function defined over characteristics, where we permit
negative values of A.'Reducing A corresponds to a more concave utility
function.
Denoting the homogeneous good by x0, the consumer chooses q and x to
solve the problem,
max U(q,O) +x (2)
subject to p(q) +x=y
where the budget constraint is instead x =yif no truck is purchased.In
this problem y denotes total income available to the consumer, p(q) is the
price of a truck depending on its characteristics, and the homogeneous good is
used as numeraire. The additively seperable form of utility in (2) simplifies
the welfare analysis, and implies that the optimal choice of truck
characteristics q is independent of income.
Several points concerning the "hedonic" price function p(q) should be
noted.We suppose that this price function is exogenously presented to the
consumer from the supply side of the market. Under perfect competition p(q)
would correspond to long—run marginal costs of firms, reflecting technology
and factor prices. The competitive case has been throughly analysed by Rosen
(1974).Under pure monopoly p(q) would be chosen by the firm to maximize
profits; this optimal control problem has been analysed by Mussa and Rosen
(1978) and Krishna (1985 ).Inthat case p(q) would depend on marginal costs
and the distribution and utility function of consumers
We shall take p(q) as exogenous, and in this section assume that a truck
of characteristics vector q0 is available, corresponding to continuous
choice for consumers.In section B below we specialize our results to the—4—
case of discrete choice.We also assume in this section that domestically
produced and imported trucks have the same hedonic price function, and do not
even distinguish these sources of supply.In section C below we consider a
tariff on imported trucks, in which case the price functions will differ.
Finally, throughout our analysis we shall use a specific functional form for
p(q), which corresponds to that used in our empirical application:
p(q) =exp(a+q) , (3)
where a > 0 and = > 0 are parameters, and all vectors are
treated as columns unless transposed using a prime.
If the consumer decides to purchase a truck, the first—order conditions
for (1) are,
=exp(a+ ,i=1,...,n, (4)
where we use a tilde to denote the optimum.Thus, given any (unobserved)
taste parameters 0 we can use (4) to solve for the optimal truck choicefor
that consumer. But turning this logic around, for any truck we can use (4)
to solve for the taste parameters 0 of the consumer who would optimally choose
that truck. We denote this relation by 0(q) =[O1(q),...,O(q)]where from
(4),
=exp(a+') iix (4)
This idea of solving for the taste parameters 0 of a consumer whose optimal
choice is will play a central role in evaluating the welfare gain from new—5—
products. For now, we simpiy observe that we can rewrite utility U(q,O) as a
function of actual consumption q and a consumerTh optimal choice ,
U[q,0()}=p().E1.qY'
, (5)
using (1), (3) and (4).
Next, we should check whether the consumer desires to purchase a truck at
all.If A > 0 then when q =0the consumer receives the disutility of s/A,
where 0 =E10.
.Thenthe consumer wishes to purchase the optimal choice
if and only if,
U(,0) p() —0/A• (6)
Multiplying (4) by ,subtractingO and summing, we find that U(,0) =p()
—U/A.It follows that (6) will hold if and only if,
(6)
If a consumers optimal choice of characteristics is low, violating (6),
then the consumer prefers to not purchase the truck and receive disutility of
—s/A.Otherwise, when (6) is satisfied the consumer obtains a higher level
of surplus by purchasing the optimal truck choice.It can be shown that
raising O increases ,soit is consumers with higher taste parameters 0
who actually purchase a truck.2
Finally, if A0 then q =0leads to disutility of negative infinity, so
in this case the optimal choiceis always purchased.—6—
3. Discrete Choice
Suppose that some exogenous set 2 =(q}of trucks is available to the
consumer at the prices p(q), given in (3). We include 0 c Q as the choice of
not purchasing a truck.To maximize utility as in (2), each consumer will
solve the problem,
max [U(q,O) —p(q)] • (7)
q cl
Let q* denote the solution to (7), where this optimal choice depends on the
taste parameters 0 and the set .
Supposenow that a new truck model becomes available. To fix ideas, we
can letdenote the set of American trucks and the new model be a Japanese
compact truck.We are interested in evaluating the welfare gain due to the
availability of the Japanese compact truck. Clearly, this gain depends on the
distribution of consumers who actually purchase the new model. Let us focus on
one individual of particular importance:the consumer for whom the newly
available model would be the optimal choice in the continuous case where all
models q )0exist. That is, letdenote the new Japanese truck and consider
the consumer with taste parameters 0(') given by (4). The utility function
for this consumer is given by (5).The gain from having the compact truck
available is,
Gain ={u[,e()]—p()}—{U[q*,0()]—p(q*)} . (8)
Thus, the gain for this consumer is simply the difference between the surplus
received from the best American choice q* and the Japanese model j.
Next,we wish to evaluate the total consumer gain from having the—7—
Japanese truck available, and here we rely on an approximation. (8) gives us
the welfare gain for the consumer who would optimally choose even if all
models q0 existed. There will be other consumers who are just indifferent
between some American model q* and the Japanese model .Theseconsumers
receive a welfare gain of zero from the new model. We evaluate the total gain
in welfare as the simple average between these two types of consumers, multip—
lied by the quantity of the Japanese model purchased:
Total consumer gain1/2 x Gain x Quantity . (9)
There are two approximations implicit in (9).The first is that the
individual consumer gain from having the compact truck available declines as a
linear function of the quantity purchased, as we consider consumers whose
optimal (continuous) choice lies further away from .Inother words, we are
assuming a linear demand curve for the Japanese model.3 This approximation is
analogous to that made in conventional measures of consumer surplus, and for
that reason, we do not regard it as unusual.
However, a second approximation is that we are ignoring some consumers
who receive an individual welfare gain greater than (8). To see this, we can





Considerthe case where the optimal choice of American truck q* is non—zero.—8—
Then since the Japanese compact truck has smaller characteristics than any
standard American model, a consumer with taste parameters smaller than O()
will receive a welfare gain from the Japanese truck which exceeds (8). If A >
0, this logic applies until we reach a consumer who would not wish to purchase
any American model, in which case the sign of (10) is reversed and lower
values of 8 reduce the welfare gain from the Japanese truck.4
In our empirical analysis we shall not attempt to account for consumers
with a welfare gain greater than (8).Accordingly, we regard the measure of
total gain given by (9) as an underestimate of the actual welfare gain.
C. Effects of a Tariff
Consider the competitive case where the hedonic price function (3) is
given by long—run marginal costs. An ad valorem tariff on Japanese imports
corresponds to a rise in a, increasing all prices by the same percentage. We
then rewrite the hedonic price function as,5
exp(a1 +rq)for Japanese compact trucks
p(q) ={ (3)
exp(cx2 +8q)for American standard trucks
with i > 2 reflecting the tariff.The effects of a tariff on consumer
choice in the continuous case have been analysed in Feenstra (1986). Here we
simply wish to see how (3) affects our measure of welfare gain from a
Japanese compact truck in the discrete case.
Using (3) the formulae for consumer gain in (8) and (9) are not
affected. The empirical measure of gain is reduced since the price of any
Japanese truck has increased.Indeed, for some values of A it is possible
that the consumer gain in (8) is negative.This means that the surplus
received from the Japanese model ,subjectto the tariff, is less than the—9—
surplus available from an American model.It follows that the Japanese truck
would not be purchased, which obviously contradicts the empirical evidence.
We regard this situation as reflecting an incorrect choice of A in theutility
function.For lower values of A the utility function becomes moreconcave,
and the difference in characteristics between a Japanesecompact and American
truck can more than compensate for the tariff, leading to positiveconsumer
gain in (8). This assertion is confirmed in our empirical analysis, where we
use the occurence of negative values for (8) as a guide to choosing
appropriate levels for A.
3. Japanese and American Trucks
Through the 1960Th and 1970Th Japanese compact trucks were imported into
the United State, while similar small domestic models were notproduced.
These trucks were imported by major Japanese producers as wellas U.S.
companies buying from subsidiaries or independent firms in Japan. Examples of
the latter, known as "captive imports" are:General Motors, which imported
the LUV pickup produced by Isuzu; Ford, which imported the Courier producedby
Toyo Kogyo; and Chrysler, which imported the Arrow and Dodge D—50 compact
trucks from Mitsubishi.This situation was altered in August 1980 by the
imposition of a 25% tariff on Japanese truck imports, up from its former level
of 4%. The tariff increase led to the development of domesticcompact trucks
by the major U.S. producers, which were sold beginning in 1982.6 At this time
all "captive imports" except the Dodge D—50 were discontinued.
The imposition of the 25% tariff on Japanese trucks has an unusual
legislative history. In 1980, Ford and the UAW applied to the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) for import relief in both the the
passenger car and the truck markets.Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of— 10—
1974,a recommendation for relief can be given only if imports are the most
important cause of injury to the domestic industry. The ITC determined that
the recession in the U.S. was a greater cause of injury to the auto industry
than rising imports, so import relief was not granted.Subsequent to this
decision the "voluntary" export restraint in cars was negotiated with Japan
(see Feenstra, 1984, 1985), while protection in trucks followed a different
route.
At this time most Japanese trucks were imported as cab/chassis with some
final assembly needed.In 1980 Congress asked the ITC to study the possible
reclassification of Japanese imports from "parts of trucks" as then applied to
"complete or unfinished trucks."The former carried a tariff rate of 4Z,
whereas the latter had a duty of 25%. That unusually high rate was a result
of the "chicken war" between the United States and Europe in 1962—63, when
Germany joined the EEC which raised its tariff on poultry imports. The U.S.
retaliated by increasing the tariff on trucks (from Volkswagon) and other
products. In 1980 the U.S. Customs Service announced that effective August 21
imported lightweight cab/chassis would be reclassified as complete trucks.
This raised the tariff rate on nearly all Japanese trucks from 4 to 25%.
In Table 1 we show the unit—values for new Japanese and American pickup
trucks over 1979—84.These data summarize a sample collected from several
different sources (listed in Tables 1, 2).Surprisingly, data reporting for
trucks has been comprehensive only in recent years.The increase in the
number of Japanese models included in our sample in 1983—84, and the increase
in American models in 1984, reflects the greater availability of data.In
earlier years the data included in our sample are only the base version of
each particular truck model. For example, in 1983 and earlier years the base
version of three standard pickups produced by GM (the C—b, C—20 and C—30) are— 11—
includedin our sample.In 1984 a total of eleven versions of these three
models are included. Utility vehicles and vans were omitted from thesample,
since it was found that these observations did not fit thesame hedonic
regression as trucks.7
The prices in our sample are manufacturerTh suggested retail.Taking the
weighted average of the prices, using current year sales as weights,yields
the unit—values in Table 1.The effect of the 25% tariff on Japanese trucks
is evident in the unit—value increase of 28.5% from 1980 to 1981.8The rise
in the unit—value over 1982—83 should be interpreted with cautionsince, as
mentioned above, in the former year only the base version of each model in
included in our sample.The unit—values for American compact trucks over
1982—84, and for American standard trucks over the entire sample period,are
also shown in Table 1.
In addition to manufacturers suggested retail price, data were collected
on various characteristics of truck models: length, weight, horsepower, four—
wheel drive, type of transmission, and other specifications. In Table2, this
information is compared for Japanese and American models in 1982. Inweight
the average Japanese model is below the average American standard truckby
33%, and in horsepower it is less by 23%. We can alsocompare a large Japa-
nese model (the Nissan 720 Kingcab) with a small American standard (the Dodge
Ram D—50; similar models are produced by GM and Ford).In this case the
Japanese compact is below the American standard in weight and slightly in
length, but not in horsepower.Turning to American compact trucks, each of
these are comparable in their price and characteristics tosome Japanese
model. In Table 2 we report the average values for Americancompacts, but do
not give a high—low range:with only four observations, there is no model
which has significantly more or less of all three characteristics than the— 12—
averageshown.
Datawere also collected on the miles per gallon (MPG) of each truck
model.It seems particularly important to include this specification in our
study, since it may be an important source of consumer gain when purchasing a
fuel—efficient Japanese model. To incorporate MPG into our analysis we follow
the method of Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), Ohta and Griliches (1983) and
Daly and Mayor (1983). For each truck model we compute the "full price" as
follows:
T
Full Price =R÷ GM/MPG(1 + p)t (11)
where R is the manufacturers suggested retail price, G is the real price of
gasoline in year t, Mt is the number of miles driven in year t, p is the
discount rate, and T is the lifetime of the truck.Thus, the full price
includes the retail price of the truck and the present discounted value of
gasoline costs.9
Values for the discounted gasoline costs in 1982 are shown in Table 2.
These costs range between one—half and three—quarters of the retail price of a
truck.We have chosen a discount rate of 7%, though it was found that the
estimates of the hedonic regressions reported below (and the implied welfare
calculations) were not sensitive to this choice. In the hedonic regressions we
use the "full price" as the dependent variable.
4. Empirical Results
A. Hedonic Regressions
We estimate the hedonic price function (3) to obtain the coefficients
needed in our welfare calculations. We shall use the estimating form,— 13—
intk = + + Ctk (12)
where t denotes years, k denotes models and is the "full price" of a
truck as in (11).We also allow to differ between compact and standard
models.The use of hedonic regressions was proposed by Griliches (1971),
while recent applications are in Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) and Ohta and
Griliches (1983). Feenstra (1984, 1985, 1986) uses this technique to measure
quality upgrading in Japanese cars imported to the U.S. under the trade
restraint.
In the first column of Table 3 we report the hedonic regression for
Japanese models, while that for American models is given in the second and
third columns. Each estimated coefficient can be given a useful interpreta-
tion:the addition of one foot in length, for example, raises price by an
estimated 1.4% for Japanese and 2.3% for American trucks, where the latter is
significant. Weight and horsepower are each highly significant in at least
one of the regressions. The dummy variable for transmission takes the value
of unity if the truck has a five—speed or automatic transmission and zero
otherwise, and similarly for four—wheel drive.'0
In the lower portion of Table 3 we show the coefficients of dummy
variables for each year, relative to 1979.These coefficients measure the
rise in nominal prices after correcting for changes in model characteristics:
the "quality—adjusted" price rise.From 1979 to 1981 the quality—adjusted
price rise is 23% for Japanese models, and this coefficient is nearly the same
in the following years. Thus, after correcting for quality change the prices
of Japanese trucks are roughly constant over 1981—84. This pattern is also
seen for the quality—adjusted price rise in American compact trucks, which is— 14—
29%from 1979 to 1982 and similar in following years (second column, Table
3). [n contrast, for American standard trucks we see a steady rise in
quality—adjusted prices over 1981—84 (third column).
If the Japanese and American regressions are not significantly different,
then our data can be combined to improve the efficiency of the estimates. We
test this hypothesis by running the pooled regression shown in the fourth and
fifth columns of Table 3.In this case the coefficients are equal for
compact and standard trucks. We also impose equal value of at for Japanese
and American compact trucks.For American standard trucks, the value of cz
differs from compact trucks for 1981, 1982 and 1984. Overall, we find that
the pooled regression is not statistically different from the seperate
regressions shown in Table 3. Using the sum of squared residuals (SSR) shown,
the F—statistic to test the various restrictions in the pooled regression is
[(0.333—0.299)I11}/(0.2991151) =1.56which compares with F095(11,151) =
1.85.Thus, we can accept these restrictions.
We also checked whether the quality coefficients of the pooled regression
in Table 3 were stable over time, by estimating the regression seperately for
each year. The resulting SSR was 0.282 with a total of 42 coefficients. The
F—statistic to test whether the quality coefficients are equal over time is
[(0.333—0.282)128]/(0.2821134) =0.866which compares with F095(28,134) =
1.55.Thus, we accept the hypothesis of stable quality coefficients.
We shall use the coefficients of the pooled regression in Table 3 for the
welfare calculations that follow.We see that each of length, weight and
horsepower are highly significant. Since Japanese and American compact models
have the same values of a, these trucks are comparable in their prices.
American standard trucks have a lower value of at, or quality—adjusted price,
for the two years 1980—81 following the imposition of the 25% tariff on— 15—
importedmodels.However, in 1984 we find that quality—adjusted prices for
American standard trucks have risen above those of compact models, witha
higher value of
B. Welfare Calculation
Before computing the welfare gain from having compact trucks available,
we need to carefully explain how our theory of section 2 is applied to the
data. Note, that in section 2 each of the characteristics were measured as
continuous variables. The theory developed there cannot be used for discrete
variables such as transmission or four—wheel drive.Accordingly we shall
treat each truck model as not including either of these characteristics. To
achieve this, if a model does come equipped with a five—speed or automatic
transmission then we divide its price by exp(O.016) (using the coefficient
from Table 3, pooled regression), and we divide its price by exp(O.19) if
equipped with four—wheel drive.
We must also deal with the residuals in our estimated hedonic regression,
that is, the difference between actual and predicted prices. Thereare two
approaches which can be taken. First, we could assume that the residual for
each model reflects unmeasured characteristics of that truck. Anexample of
this would be power steering, for which data was not available on American
models.1' In this case a low price(negative residual) would indicate some
undesirable specification of the truck, and would not lead toany rise in
consumer surplus. At the other extreme, we could assume that any difference
between actual and predicted prices is unrelated to model specifications, so a
negative residual would lead to a rise in consumer surplus by exactly that
dollar amount.
It turns out that the latter assumption is inconsistent with our data.— 16—
Wefind one model in particular —theC—10 standard pickup produced by General
Motors —whichhas negative residuals in the hedonic regression ranging from
—$300 to —$1,000 dollars in various years.If this represents a source of
gain to consumers buying the truck, then it may be impossible to identify a
consumer who would wish to purchase a Japanese compact (which had much smaller
residuals).Put differently, when the negative residual from the C—10 is
added to (8), the resulting consumer gain from having the compact truck
available would be negative. Accordingly, in our calculations below we rely
on the former assumption, that each residual reflects unmeasured character-
istics. This means that we use the predicted price from the hedonic
regression as reflecting what people pay for the three characteristics we have
idntif led (length, weight, horsepower).Thus, the predicted price corres-
ponds to p(q) in (3) or (3).
We can now briefly review how our welfare calculation is performed.
Choose some value for A in the utility function (1), and let denote the
characteristics of a Japanese model. Then we use (4) to solve for the taste
parameters of a consumer who would optimally choose this model. Let 2 denote
the set of American models (compact or standard). For this consumer we deter-
mine the best American choice q* in (7), and then compute the consumer gain as
in (8), (9). We repeat this calculation for each Japanese model in each
year. In addition, we do the same calculation for each American compact model
over 1982—1984.In that case denotes an American compact, 2 the set of
Japanese models, and q* the best Japanese choice.
In Table 4 we show the results of our welfare calculation for A =—8,—10
and —15.The consumer gains shown are expressed in dollars per truck pur-
chased.We first report a weighted average of the gains for individual
Japanese and American models, using current year sales as weights.These— 17—
figurescould be multiplied by the quantities in Table 1 to obtain the total
consumer gain (9).We also report the range of welfare gains obtained over
individual Japanese and American models.
Considering first the Japanese models, recall that these had a value of
in the hedonic regression which exceeded American standard trucks for 1981
and 1982.That is, due to the tariff the import prices exceeded those of
domestic standard trucks after correcting for quality differences. From our
discussion in section 2C, it is then possible that the welfare gains due to a
Japanese model may be negative for some values of A.This means that the
consumer benefits due to having a truck with smaller characteristics available
are less than the tariff. Under these circumstances, we argued that A should
be reduced to allow for greater concavity of the utility function.
With A0 we found that all nine Japanese models had negative gain in
1981. This result continues for some negative values of A: for example, at A
=—5six Japanese models have negative gain in 1981. The first value at which
most Japanese models have positive welfare gain is A =—8,and these results
are shown in the first rows of Table 4•12 We regard these as minimum esti-
mates of the consumer gains (or actually underestimates, as argued in section
2B).In 1979 and 1980 the average gains are $530 and $486 per truck, respec-
tively, which are 10% or more of the average retail price.In 1981 the
consumer gain drops to $87 due to the tariff on Japanese compacts. After 1981
there are two opposing effects on the measure of gain: the price differential
between Japanese trucks and American standard models is reduced (and reversed
by 1984), while at the same time American compact trucks become available.
The first effect raises the welfare gain due to Japanese pickups while the
second effect lowers it.For 1982—84 we see that the consumer gain remains
substantially less than its value before 1981, varying around $100 per truck.— 18—
Inthe next rows of Table 4 the results for A =—10and —15 are shown.
Considering A =—15,the average consumer gains for Japanese trucks in 1979
and 1980 are $628 and $582, respectively. These figures substantially exceed
10% of the retail price (unit—value) in Table 1. Moreover, the consumer who
would optimally choose each Japanese model under continuous choice receives a
gain which is twice as high (compare (8) and (9)), or over 20% of the retail
price. In later years the consumer gains fall due to the tariff on Japanese
trucks and the introduction of American compact models, varying around $200
per truck over 1981=84.
-
Turningto American compact models, we obtain estimates of consumer gains
due to these models which are surprisingly low. For example, with A =—15the
gain is $23—32 per truck over 1982—84. The reason is that for each American
compact in our sample there is a Japanese truck with very similiar character-
istics. As a result, the gains to consumers from having either the American
or corresponding Japanese truck available, given that the other model already
exists, are small. From the ranges reported in Table 4 is is seen that the
low gains on American trucks also occur for some Japanese models. However, in
each year there are other Japanese models which are not that similar to an
American model.As a result, the average consumer gains for Japanese trucks
over 1982—84 are much greater than for American compacts.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a methodology for estimating the welfare
gains from a product with new characteristics, and applied it to Japanese and
American compact trucks. Our approach can be used on any products for which a
hedonic regression can be estimated.The coefficients of this regression,
together with the parameter A indicating concavity of the utility function,— 19—
areenough information to perform the welfare calculation. The application to
Japanese compact trucks is of particular interst since prior to 1982 similar
American models did not exist.
For 1979—80 we found average welfare gains of $500—600 per Japanese
truck.Multiplying these figures by the quantity of trucks purchased each
year gives the total consumer gains.In later years the benefit to consumers
is reduced by the tariff on imports and the introduction of Americancompact
models.For 1982—84 we found welfare gains of about $100—200 per Japanese
truck, though the range was considerably wider for individual models.In
evaluating consumer benefits we have not included tariff revenue on Japanese
imports, as would be necessary in a social calculation.
American compacts had consumer gains which were much less than the
average for Japanese models, since for each American compact there was an
import with very similar characteristics.For American trucks the consumer
gains would need to be compared to research and development costs of compact
mopdels to determine the net social gain or loss.If the average gains of
$15—30 we found per American compact are less the R&D costs, then the
additional diversity introduced by American models is not socially desirable.
However, we should note that the present study has not included vans and
utility vehicles. There are many more compact vehicles of this type
introduced by American than by Japanese producers. Accordingly, some American
compact vans or utility vehicles would not have similar imported versions, and
we would expect larger consumer gains due to the availability of these
products.— 22—
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paper no. 1211, October.Table 1: Sample of Japanese and American Trucks
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Japanese
No. of models 8 8 9 9 16 16
Unit—Value ($) 4,741 4,907 6,304 6,389 7,097 7,229
Quantity (1,000) 464 479 427 403 440 649
American Compact
0 0 0 4 5 6 No. of models
Unit—Value Cs)
— — — 6,279 6,338 6,485
Quantity (1,000) 0 0 0 282 410 466
American Standard
16 13 13 13 13 27 No. of models
Unit—Value ($) 5,601 6,059 6,646 7,572 7,709 8,640
Quantity (1,000) 1,971 1,287 1,112 1,000 997 1,304
Sources:
Prices for Japanese models were obtained from Automotive News, Market Data Book,
1979—84 years. Prices for American models were obtained from the National
Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), Official Used Car Guide, Eastern Edition,
July 1985. All prices are manufacturers suggested retail.Quantities were
obtained from Wards Automotive Yearbook, 1979—84, reported by company. These were










Weighted Average 6,389 14.6 2,571 92 3,633
Low (Isuzu Pickup) 6,129 14.5 2,374 78 3,273
High (Nissan 720 King) 7,229 15.6 2,999 98 3,819
American Compact
6,279 14.7 2,422 79 3,351 Weighted Average
American Standard
7,572 16.8 3,847 120 5,158 Weighted Average
Low (Dodge D—100) 6,721 16.1 3,405 90 4,365
Sources:
Characteristics for Japanese models were obtained from Automotive News, Market Data
Book, 1979—84 years. Characteristics for American models were obtained from Wards
Automotive Yearbook, 1979—84. Miles per gallon data, used in constructing gasoline
costs, are from the Environmental Protection Agency as reported in Automotive News
and Wards. Weighted averages use current year sales as weights.Table 3: Hedonic Regressions, Dependent Variable —FullPrice
Sample Japanese American All Trucks
Compact Standard CompactStandard
Obs. 66 15 95 81 95
R2 0.947 0.944 0.955
SSR 0.105 0.194 0.333
Constant 8.25* 8.08* 513*
(0.17) (0.080) (0.062)
Length (feet) 0.014 0.023* 0.021*
(0.012) (0.0065) (0.0055)
Weight (tons) 0.18 0.28* 0.27
(0.11) (0.039) (0.025)
Horsepower (100) 0.30* 0.17* 0.18*
(0.063) (0.027) (0.024)
Transmission 0.037* 0.010 0.016
(0.017) (0.013) (0.0088)
Four—wheel Drive 0.23* 0.18* 0.19
(0.024) (0.013) (0.011)
Year 1980 0.069* 0.079* 0.077* 0.077*
(0.029) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Year 1981 0.23* 0.16* 0.24* 0.15*
(0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)
Year 1982 0.23* 0.29* 0.23* 0.26* 0.22*
(0.022) (0.033) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Year 1983 0.21* 0.27* 0.26* 0.25* 0.25*
(0.022) (0.032) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Year 1984 0.22* 0.30* 0.32 0.26* 0.32*
(0.022) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
*Significant at 95% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 4: Consumer Gain from Compact Trucks (Dollars)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
A=—8
Japanese Average 530 486 87 79 139 103
Range 454—598376—538 0—169 0—145 10—345 9—470
American Average — — — 17 13 17
Range 9—51 8—28 11—41
A =—10
Japanese Average 567 522 126 110 173 124
Range 479—638404—578 0—214 15—19813—397 10—489
American Average — — 21 16 21
Range 10—64 10—33 13—50
A =—15
Japanese Average 628 582 193 222 272 189
Range 537—701450—645 0—286 22—39719—521 14—640
American Average — — — 32 23 32
Range 14—99 14—47 19—70